WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court ruled June 25 that federal pesticide law preempts a Missouri jury’s finding that Monsanto should have placed a cancer warning on its Roundup weedkiller, reversing a $1 million-plus verdict in favor of a longtime user who developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.
In a 7-2 decision in Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, the Court held that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) expressly preempts state failure-to-warn claims that would require a cancer warning on Roundup’s label, because the Environmental Protection Agency has repeatedly approved and reapproved that label without one. Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Thomas also filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch.
John Durnell sued Monsanto in Missouri state court in 2019, alleging that roughly 20 years of Roundup use caused his cancer and that the company should have warned consumers of the risk. A jury awarded Durnell more than $1 million on his failure-to-warn theory, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Monsanto’s argument that FIFRA barred the claim. “The Supreme Court granted review to resolve a split among federal and state courts over whether FIFRA preempts Roundup failure-to-warn claims.”
Writing for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh explained that FIFRA’s preemption clause, titled “Uniformity,” bars states from imposing labeling requirements “in addition to or different from” those required under the statute. Because the EPA first approved Roundup’s label without a cancer warning in 1974 and has since repeatedly reaffirmed that determination — most recently after the International Agency for Research on Cancer classified glyphosate as a probable carcinogen — the majority concluded that federal law requires Monsanto to use that label unless and until the EPA approves a change. A state jury verdict requiring a different label, the Court held, conflicts with that federal requirement and is therefore preempted.
The majority relied heavily on Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. (2008), in which the Court held that the Food and Drug Administration’s premarket approval of medical devices imposed “requirements” that preempted parallel state tort claims under a similarly worded federal statute. The Court rejected Durnell’s arguments that FIFRA’s general misbranding standard, rather than the EPA’s specific label approval, defines the relevant federal requirement, and it rejected his reliance on a FIFRA provision stating that registration is not a complete defense to enforcement actions.
In a concurrence, Justice Thomas agreed with the outcome but questioned FIFRA’s constitutionality more broadly, suggesting the statute may exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and raise improper delegation of legislative power to the EPA.
In dissent, Justice Jackson argued that the majority misread FIFRA. She wrote that the EPA’s approval of a label is only “prima facie evidence” of compliance with the statute, not a conclusive federal requirement, and that a registered pesticide can still be “misbranded” if it lacks a necessary warning. In her view, Missouri’s failure-to-warn standard simply parallels — rather than adds to — FIFRA’s own misbranding prohibition, so it should not be preempted. She also distinguished Riegel on the ground that FIFRA, unlike the medical device statute at issue there, expressly preserves manufacturers’ ongoing duty to avoid misbranding even after registration.
The Court reversed the judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Insight
This ruling is likely to reshape the large volume of pending Roundup litigation nationwide that rests on the same failure-to-warn theory the Court has now rejected. Plaintiffs’ attorneys will likely look for alternative paths around failure to warn preemption — for example, by arguing design defect claims (the product itself is unreasonably dangerous or breach of implied warranty claims. Because the decision also resolves a long-standing split among courts that had mostly gone the other way, it may also prompt renewed calls for Congress to revisit FIFRA’s preemption clause, since the ruling forecloses a state-court remedy for plaintiffs alleging similar injuries going forward.
— The Trial Attorneys Editorial Staff
